MiG-29 Fulcrum

The MiG-29 and Su-27 came from the same requirement: in the 1970s the Soviet Union concluded it needed a heavy long-range air superiority fighter alongside a light frontal fighter, much as the United States chose the F-15 plus the F-16. Their aerodynamic thinking is closely aligned — widely spaced engines, large leading-edge extensions, twin fins — with the MiG-29 simply a size smaller.

In a close-in fight it performs very well: high thrust-to-weight, strong vortex lift, and a helmet-mounted sight paired with the R-73 missile. NATO confirmed this repeatedly after German reunification, when it inherited East Germany's MiG-29 fleet and flew it against the F-16.

But one limitation it never escaped: internal fuel of only 3.5 tonnes and a combat radius around 700 km. That sufficed for the Central European scenario it was designed around — and outside that scenario its tactical value drops sharply. It is why so many MiG-29s were left idle after the Soviet collapse while the Flanker line kept spawning derivatives.

The most distinctive engineering decision is in the inlets: the main intakes can be closed off entirely during takeoff and landing, with air drawn instead through louvres on the upper wing surface. This prevents foreign-object ingestion when operating from unpaved strips — a requirement no contemporary Western fighter considered, and a direct reflection of different expectations about wartime airfield conditions.

Cockpit visibility is another clear gap. The MiG-29's canopy has more framing and a lower seat, giving rearward vision far short of the F-16's bubble. In a visual fight that is a real disadvantage.

The N019 radar is limited by nose aperture, with detection range and multi-target capability well below the Su-27's. A light fighter's compromises in sensors are harder to offset than its compromises in aerodynamics — already visible in this generation, and more pronounced in the fifth.